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hence to avoid confusion we will explain our use of the term.5 A good starting point 
for approaching posthuman perspectives would be to say that it represents a 
reaction against the view of human exceptionalism (or anthropocentrism/ 
humanocentricism). This view that humans are marked off from the huge diversity of 
non-human animal life because of their ‘exceptional characteristics’, such as the 
possession of syntactical language or the possession of ‘free will’ is, as John Gray 
remarks, ‘a Christian inheritance’.6 It is a problematic inheritance in that it fails to 
recognise the significance of Darwin’s arguments for the concept of species as about 
differentials; and of the complexity of ‘life’ shaped by interdependencies. 7 Human 
exceptionalism, for Donna Haraway is ‘the premise that humanity alone is not a 
spatial and temporal web of interspecies dependencies’.8 In other words it is a 
reaction to view that human beings hold some extraordinary position within nature. 
For William Connolly such exceptionalism is ‘a central danger of our time’, and while 
humans perhaps reflect more about their mortality and place within nature this does 
not excuse the species from ‘from thinking closely about the complex relations 
between the human estate and a host of nonhuman processes with variable degrees 
of agency. It, rather, accentuates the latter need’.9  
Posthumanism, from this perspective, marks a challenge to the view that human 
beings as a species then can be seen as separated from the rest of non-human 
nature. This view needs to be distinguished from other uses of the term of 
posthumanism. One of these other uses refers to issues of body modification, in 
particular in the form of the cyborg.10 We prefer to use the term transhumanism (or 
even superhumanism) to describe work in this area.  
While there are uses of the term to indicate a time ‘after humanity’, 11 we would 
again want to distinguish our use of the term. In essence, our use of posthumanism 
is to indicate the understanding of ‘humanity’ as embedded in networks of relations 
of dependency with the non-human lifeworld, to emphasise the fragility of 
embodied life. In addition, we want to emphasise the importance of a posthumanist 
lens in examining phenomena which, in international politics, are often seen as 
exclusively human such as the practice of war, the delivery of welfare and security, 
the distribution of resources, the recognition of rights and indeed, the development 




























































































The Standard of Civilization and the Question of the Human 
 
The question of what it is to be human is one that confronted encounters between 
different social groups. In certain encounters the question was raised whether the 
members of other social groups were even human. According to Sven Lindquist, 
William Perry was one of the first to articulate the view that there was more than 
one species of human being, ‘of which some were considered to be closer to 
animals’.12 A theological basis for such a multi-species humanity was found in the 
notion of polygenism – the view that ‘white genealogies proceed from a different act 
of creation to that of non-whites’.13 Such ideas were challenged by Darwin’s 
evolutionary theories (although these also provided the basis for differentiating 
different social groups related to their evolutionary status) yet managed to survive 
into the twentieth century. 
 
Following the encounter with the ‘new world’ as a result of Columbus’ voyages of 
discovery there was much heated discussion in Spain about the status of the 
indigenous population. Some of the early Spanish explorers raised doubts about 
whether the people they met were indeed human or of another species. For 
example, a Dr Chanca, who accompanied Columbus on his second voyage, remarked 
of the indigenous population that ‘their bestiality is greater than any beast in the 
world.’14 John Elliott notes that ‘it was precisely the question of the humanity, or the 
degree of humanity, of the peoples of America which was the cause of such agitated 
debate throughout the sixteenth century’.15 The upshot of these arguments was that 
‘from the beginning there were sharp disagreements about the nature of American 
man.’16 In the view of the legal theorist Vitoria the indigenous population ‘really 
seem little different from brute animals’.17 While debates over the status of the 
indigenous population continued throughout the sixteenth century, the status of 
these communities as human was eventually accepted though the extent to which 
they achieved perceived criteria of humanity, such as rationality and the 
receptiveness to Christianity, ‘remained a matter of continuous debate.’18 
 
Debates about the status within the human species of different societies re-emerged 
following Captain Cook’s encounter with the Australian continent. The indigenous 
population, with a radically different culture, sparked much dispute, particularly 
given the desire of the British to claim the continent. Raymond Evans quotes an early 










































































































































































































continuum between savagery and civilization.27 There was a direct link between the 
place on this spectrum and the level of civilization, and hence the form of response 
any society was likely to get from the most civilized. As Brett Bowden observes, 
‘standards of civilization are a direct consequence of the twin concepts of civilization 
and progress and the associated idea of a civilizational hierarchy ranging from 
savages to the civilized.’28 
 
Within this classificatory spectrum the savage was seen as primarily a hunter, with 
litle or no permanent setlement, the barbarian as the inhabitant of societies with a 
degree of reliance of livestock. This form of classification was based on the 
assumption that certain forms of human organization were to be preferred, and that 
those outside of these preferences were to be either brought within these forms of 
society, or would naturaly die out or be exterminated. That there was a path from 
savagery to civilization that could be traversed drew very much on Darwin’s 
evolutionary theory, and through the later part of the nineteenth century and into 
the twentieth century it became an accepted expectation that societies would either 
make that transition or would be overwhelmed. In this sense one interpretation of 
Darwin provided the justificatory basis for the extermination of social groups that 
were seen as too close to nature. Summing up this perspective Jacques Depelchin 
poses the question, ‘after al, weren’t the Natives of al conquered / colonized / 
occupied lands accused of being too close to Nature and therefore in need of 
civilisation?’29 
 
John Locke was also an influential source of ideas about the character of social 
formation, and in particular with the relationships with the rest of society. For Locke 
the halmark of a civilized society was the use of labour to subdue the land. And the 
process of working the land (as opposed to merely enjoying its fruits), gave the right 
to owning it. Locke comments that ‘subduing or cultivating the earth, and having 
dominion, we see are joined together.. God, by commanding to subdue, gave 
authority so far to appropriate.’ If land was not put into productive use, in a 
European sense, it was regarded as wasted, and if there were no formal deeds of 
property to the land then no one had a claim on that land. Therefore to exploit the 
land was an obligation. This was the point made by Vattel when he stated that 
agriculture was an ‘obligation imposed upon man by nature’. Those who survived on 
the ‘fruits of the chase’ should not be too surprised ‘if other more industrious 
Nations should come and occupy part of their lands’.31 
Arguments about the character of civilization have therefore focused centraly on 
the character of human relations with the rest of nature. Ultimately a social group 









































































































































































































?????????????????? ??????????? ??????????????????????? ????? ????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????
??????????????????????????? ?? ?????????????????????????????????????????? ????? ????
?????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??? ??????? ?????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????
???????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
?????????????????????????? ??????? ??????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????






























































































??? ????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????? ???????? ??????






























































































































? ????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????? ???????

















































































































































































































?????????????????????????????????? ????????????????? ??????????????? ??????????????










???????????? ?????????? ????????? ???????????????????????????????? ????? ???????
????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????? ?????????????????????
????? ?????????????????????? ????????? ????? ??????? ???? ???????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ??????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????? ?????????? ?????????????? ???????? ????????????
????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????










??? ?????? ??????????? ?????? ??????????? ?????????? ?????????? ???? ????? ???????? ???????
????????? ??????? ????? ?????? ??????????? ??? ???? ???????? ???????? ???? ???????? ?????????









































































?????????? ????? ?????? ??? ???? ???????? ????????????? ?????????? ??? ?????????????????????????


















































































































civilization in terms of a nuanced notion of global footprint might be a useful way 
forwards. Yet such a nuanced notion must eschew notions of the ‘average citizen’ of 
the United States, or Brazil, or France, or Malawi but consider the differential impact 
of populations within different political regions in terms of their ‘power to pollute’.  
For Plumwood this would be too simple a move and heavily shaped by the dominant 
culture of reason that undergirds our established notion of what a civilized life might 
look like. The failure of contemporary Western cultures to attain sustainability or 
even to move in any committed way towards it, is rooted in systemic problems of a 
type of rationality whose ‘simple, abstract rules of equivalence and replaceability do 
not fit the real, infinitely complex world of flesh and blood, root and web on which 
they are so ruthlessly imposed’. Ultimately, she suggests that ‘ecological crisis is the 
crisis of a cultural “mind” that cannot acknowledge and adapt itself to its material 
“body,” the embodied and ecological support base it draws on in the long-denied 
counter-sphere of “nature”’."3 Plumwood argues that indigenous people offer ways 
of thinking from which the West might learn. Europeans traditionally focus their 
thinking and their efforts on themselves and small groups associated with them, a 
process that marks other people and, indeed, the rest of the world as the "Other" 
and prioritises the needs wants and desires of those few in our sphere of interest. 
Cognisant of the diversity of indigenous cultures and their worldviews, and careful to 
note that no claims are universally true of all indigenous peoples, Plumwood draws 
on particular examples (primarily from aboriginal Australian and Native American 
cultures) to argue that interspecies communicative ethics is not an abstract 
philosophical ideal but an ancient and still-present cultural practice. Such cultures, 
she argues, are grounded in an ethics of belonging and community (rather than 
conquest and private property) and on flourishing (rather than wealth).  Such an ethic 
of nourishment and interdependency between diverse groups of humans and 
nonhuman nature must replace the institutional structures and dominant 
conceptions of rationality found in capitalist modernity and the conceptions of the 
disembodied and exclusionary self. Plumwood argues that an ethical emphasis on 
value and rights (and private property) inevitably creates rankings that replicate the 
myth of the Great Chain of Being and continue to measure all other life in 
comparison to (elite) humans."" Instead of thinking of the project of ethics as a 
matter of extending the boundaries of human-centered thought and recognizing the 
value of others in relation to human worth, Plumwood suggests that we begin with 
basic respect for all life and approach others with an ethos of intentional recognition 
and openness.
Her critical argument is distinctively posthuman. She contends that currently 
dominant conceptions of rationality make it virtually impossible to see nonhumans 
as agents in their own right and as communicative beings and systems that are 




















































































?????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???? ??????????















???????? ???????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????















?? ???????? ????? ???? ????? ??? ???????????? ??????? ?????? ????? ?? ????? ??? ???? ?????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????







































































































































































































































??????? ?? ????????????????????? ???
??????????
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
